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ABSTRACT
Abstracte Internet ofings (IoT) is the technology, which forms
the foundation of todays smart and connected world. e IoT is a
network used to interconnect embedded devices, such as sensors,
which are able to generate, communicate and share data with one
another. In such an enormous network of interconnected smart
objects, the identication of a specic object poses a fundamental
task that inuences all other functions of the system, such as its
governance, privacy features, access control, overall architecture,
etc. is paper presents a critical review of the prominent and
recent authentication techniques for IoT objects. is is followed by
a discussion of the limitations of current authentication techniques
and future research avenues and opportunities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Arguably, nothing aects our lives more than technology. Every
day, it has something new to oer or it can provide us with new
challenges to solve. However, technological advancements occur
amidst a series of diculties. Among the signicant developments
witnessed in technology, one such phenomenon is the Internet
of ings (IoT). IoT is described as a network of interconnected
things, objects or devices that are equipped with sensors, network
connectivity and other essential electronics that enables them to
collect and exchange data about their environment [3].
In large-scale networks of interconnected ‘smart objects’, the
identication of a specic object rises a fundamental challenge that
inuences all other functions of the system, such as its governance,
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privacy features, access control, overall architecture, etc. Authenti-
cation is the process of identifying users and objects in networks to
restrict access to authorized people and non-manipulated devices.
Traditionally, authentication mechanisms rely on usernames and
passwords, which can be easily compromised, need frequent chang-
ing, do not particularly suite unaended devices and broad range
objects used do not support next-generation security functions.
eir limitations become obvious as we try to connect devices of
dierent vendors; most HTTP-based authentication protocols are
bootstrapped through user interaction, which does not scale in IoT.
Finally, smart objects oen have constraints on resources including
energy, memory, computational speed and communications band-
width. Scarce resources necessitates only lightweight operations
on the smart objects, particularly, if a distributed authentication is
implemented to achieve scalability.
Cryptographic mechanisms present a robust way of securing the
IoT against a variety of aacks, e.g., rmware tampering. However,
cryptographic protocols incur high computation and communi-
cation load. Additionally, the specication IEEE 802.15.4 has key
management problems and inadequate integrity protection. Con-
sequently, the highly constrained IoT environment does not easily
support cryptographic solutions. e gathering and use of data
from smart devices that people interact with and control on a daily
basis has several implications related to privacy. Not all privacy
requirements can be satised only by the authentication schemes,
but support for privacy at dierent levels is an essential property.
e key challenge in a privacy preserving authentication scheme
is to guarantee its ability to guard the possibility to link informa-
tion from smart objects with a particular user or group of users.
To illustrate, consider data about the location of a specic object.
is, in itself does not raise a privacy concern, unless this object
is associated to a specic user. is link makes the data valuable
and deserving protection. Yet, the idea of ambient backed living
and many of its applications are founded on the voluntary sacrice
of particular private information. erefore, the challenge is how
authentication schemes should provision the preservation of user’s
privacy, while also supporting the development of applications and
scenarios, e.g., emergency call, where the user chooses to voluntary
reduce his level of privacy?
is paper provides an in-depth survey of recent authentication
methods specically developed for IoT devices. Aer the introduc-
tion, Section 2 presents a survey of prominent and recent authenti-
cation methods developed specically for IoT ecosystems. Section
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3 identies the current gaps in the literature and outlines future
research avenues. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES FOR IOT
Establishing an object identity in IoT is critical to the privacy and
security of the system users and owners. erefore, ecient au-
thentication techniques is crucial in order to establish secure and
trusted IoT ecosystem. In this section we present a review of recent
authentication IoT object authentication methods.
A One Time Password (OTP) authentication scheme for IoT,
which is based on elliptic curves is presented in [16]. is method
of authentication has been developed from pairing facilitated by
elliptic curves. Private Key Generator (PKG) generates the OTP,
and at the same time, it assumes the role of validation at the IoT
platform. OTP generation occurs in a scheme that runs in four
phases namely setup, extraction, generation, and validation. In the
rst phase, PKG produces a pair of numbers p and q, which are
prime numbers. In this scheme p = (2)2 ± c , where c must be less
than loд2n. At the time p = 3(mod4). On the other hand, q |p + 1
as a super singular elliptic curve. ese parameters, which are
primarily cryptographic are used to optimize the computations so
that the resulting scheme is lightweight. In the second phase, IoT
applications and devices register with the KPG and obtain private
and public keys. ese keys act as the torsion point on the elliptic
curve. e third phase is the generation phase. In this stage, the
authors assert that the application requests or sends data to the IoT
device with an identication and an instance of time via a cloud
platform. e PKG at the IoT cloud auto generates the key of the
requesting device, which acts as the torsions point in this case.
A new torsion point is generated for the device on the curve at
that point and time. e requested data focuses on the new device
and application. e nal phase is validation. In this phase, this
application and the device exchange data through OTP. Once OTP
gets to the device, the device veries the OTP as sourced from the
application and if so, it accomplishes the task required. is method
relies on the Lamport algorithm for its security by generating the
OTP.
A certicate based authentication technique was presented in [8]
to redress the issues of password based authentication. is tech-
nique requires that certication authorities issue certicates to
users. Arguably, promoters of this method advocate that those who
verify users’ passwords at some point know those passwords or at
least, data that is equal to them. However, this is dierent to viable
certicate based authentication. e certicates are issued and
certied by a remote authority who seals the link between them
and the public cryptographic key. Certicate based authentication
works under a very strict principle, providing that those who issue
the certicates and those who award access be dierentiated. e
interconnection scenario proposed by [8] consists of a smart object,
gateways and service. e smart object is divided into two classes
according to its RAM and ROM size. Each gateway connects groups
of objects in the Web of ings (WoT) Domain, and also to the local
network or Internet as shown in 1.
For security, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) hand-
shake protocol is used to authenticate clients on the server. Full
DTLS handshake protocol is suitable for objects with large RAM
Figure 1: Authentication network scenario as presented
in [8]
and ROM size, but in many cases, IoT object/devices are limited in
hardware resources [1, 4, 5]. To address this, the authors propose
to delegate the initial handshake to the owner of an object. is
approach assumes that the object has a unique identier ID and
secret key, and suggests that it should be embedded in the device at
the manufacturing time. is authentication technique can be de-
scribed in four major steps: 1. Out-of-band shared-secret exchange
2; Certicate-based TLS or DTLS handshake; 3. Session-state trans-
fer; 4. DTLS session resumption.
e authors of [15] propose an identity Management (IDM) sys-
tem that focuses on providing access authorization as well as au-
thentication for IoT users. e presented IDM and key-based au-
thentication method provides single sing-on to IoT devices. is
technique integrates four components, namely; the entity, in this
case, the user, identity, in this case, their identiers, identity providers,
in this case, IdP and service providers. e work published in [18]
suggest that an Identify provider (IdP) can manage the identity of
users and their authentication characteristics; therefore, providing
necessary credentials for their access to the system. In this pro-
cess, credentials allow users to access the system while the service
provider avails services to these users, according to the credentials
they provide. A good example of this system is an open IdP [15].
ere are works that have suggested the use of IDM in IoT, among
other schemes that require user identication. Salman et al. [15] ad-
vocate that the IDM system for IoT would be easy to use and secure.
Also, they believe that the method will enhance the operation of the
system. e benets of IdP are that it makes non-interactive login
possible. is method provides beer identity checks via a private
keys. ey are more secure than passwords, as malicious users
must obtain the private key and their corresponding paraphrase to
use the system.
Another IoT authentication technique that relies on patented
hardware is presented in [13]. is technique is based on an in-
trinsic ID to provide IoT device authentication using its physical
unclonable functions. A unique authentication process is used
in the extraction of an IoT device security keys and its unique
identiers. ese unique identiers result from special traits of
semi-conductors. Since these keys are only generated from the
device unclonable features, they provide high level protection. e
rationale behind this technique is especially true because the keys
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Figure 2: Arbiter physical unclonable circuit. Adopted
from [13]
are generated from the device on-board chips and their physical
characteristics. Moreover, this method can be used to prevent
identity the through counterfeiting or cloning IoT devices. e
proposed combines the use of the physical unclonable function and
the elliptic curve cryptography. It is argued that the use of these
technologies together will reduce the cost of tamper protection and
lower the authentication computational and power requirements.
e process of enrollment and authentication of the IoT device
depends on gathering a public key from the device, continually
generating the private key as needed, and without the need the to
store that private key in the device. is technique is illustrated
in 2.
Similar to [13], the work published in [9] focuses on authenti-
cation of devices in smart home environments using the physical
properties of IoT devices and communications. e smart home en-
vironment use a variety of communication protocols. e proposed
methods rely on using both the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
and Physical Key Generation (PKG). e authors promote that the
combination of the two methods results in an immediate enhance-
ment of security. ey also suggest reusing existing hardware to
reduce overall system costs. e authentication process happens in
four major steps. Firstly, the enrollment phase, which is done by
the manufacturer who generates a random set of challenges that
are presented to the PUF. e PUF responds to each challenge with
a response R. Secondly, a functionW is used to generate the device
secret key. is second step is referred to as the Key Generation
Phase, which is carried on by the PKG to produceKi from the noisy
channel of the PUF. is key is used as the symmetric encryption
key. e third step is called the Authentication Phase, and in this
stage, the hash ofKi obtained from the last step is used to recover
a challenge with a known response. e PUF knows all the valid
challenges so, it generates the responseRi , using the helper Data
functionW . e hash of the responseh(Ri ) is sent to the server en-
crypted byKi . e nal step is called the Re-enrollment Phase. is
phase is done when a secure connection between the device and
the server is established. In this step, a set of new valid challenges,
responses and helper data, are all replenished.
A security approach that depends on grouping nodes into layers
is proposed in [11]. Each layer has a layer manager and one or more
cell. Every cell has a cell manager, which controls the communi-
cation with other cells. e authentication process is done either
directly or indirectly. Direct authentication is performed between
peer nodes in the same cell, which requires that any node knows
Figure 3: Layer with cells and direct connection between
nodes in dierent cells. Adopted from [11].
the certicate of its peer in advance. In indirect authentication,
a node must contact its cell manager in order to get its peer cer-
ticate. Where nodes belong to dierent cell managers, indirect
authentication is done between these cell managers using the cer-
ticates issued by their layer manager. is distributed security
management approach is illustrated in 3.
In Peng’s [14] study, an ID-based authentication approach is
proposed. In this technique, every node is authenticated by its
neighbor’s ID, which is distributed to each node once it connects
to the network. e data is aggregated at each Node, along with its
authenticated neighbor’s ID, and sent to the sink node through its
aggregator. e authentication process is performed at the sink that
maintains a binding list of the nodes authentication neighbors’ ID.
Once authentication is successfully conrmed, the data is extracted.
Authentication and Access Control (ECC) in the Internet of
ings was proposed by [12]. It uses two trusted authority models;
the Registration Authority (RA) and the Home Registration Author-
ity (HRA). When a user wants to access an object, the object issues
an authentication request to the RA. en, the RA asks for the user
ID and contacts the HRA for user verication. e HRA veries
the user and sends the result back to the RA. Finally, when the
verication process has been successfully achieved, the RA issues a
session key, which is used in communication with the user, based
on ECC.
Recently, Jan et al. proposed a robust authentication scheme for
observing resources in IoT environments [10]. eir authentication
scheme adds security features to the Constrained Application Proto-
col (CoAP) in order to perform secure client-server communication.
e authentication process is performed in four-way handshake
messages based on a pre-shared key between the client and the
server. Firstly, the client sends its ID to the server. en, the server
retrieves a pre-shared key from its lockup table, generates a session
key and a nonce, encrypts them in a message, and sends it back to
the client. In the third step, the client decrypts the message, extracts
the session key, and replies to the server with an encrypted message
that contains the nonce. Finally, the server veries the nonce aer
decrypting the message using the session key and acknowledges
the authentication.
More recently, Salman et al. [15] published an identity-based
authentication scheme for IoT. is network security solution is
patented. emethod includes a SowareDenedNetworking (SDN)
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Figure 4: Illustration of the identity controller gateway
structure adopted from [15].
Table 1: Authentication Process Classication
DSM OTP CBA IDM PUF
[16] X
[8] X
[18] X
[15] X
[17] X
[9] X
[14] X
[12] X
[10] X
[11] X
controller, which is responsible for authenticating and managing
all the gateways and nodes in the network, as shown in 4.
e authentication process consists of three major phases. Dur-
ing phase 1, the gateway acquire a public key certicate from the
controller. In phase 2, the controller generates a hashed IPv6 using
the object/thing ID, a randomly generated nonce sent by object,
and the gateway certicate that connects the node to the controller.
In phase 3, the node authenticates itself using the hashed IPv6 and
nonce signed by the gateway public key.
e reviewed authentication techniques can be classied ac-
cording to the following authentication process: Certicate Based
Authentication (CBA), OTP, IDM, Distributed SecurityManagement
(DSM) and PUF. 1 presents this classication.
IoT authentication techniques can also be classied based on the
encryption methods used. Encryption plays a critical role in authen-
tication authentication processes. e hardware limitations of IoT
devices makes the utilization of complicated encryption techniques
impractical or even impossible. In the literature, dierent authenti-
cation approaches used various types of encryption algorithms, as
shown in 2. is table shows that majority of the reviewed methods
use asymmetric encryption. To solve the problem of large key sizes,
most of these methods used Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to
handle the encryption.
3
Table 2: Classication of authentication approaches by em-
ployed encryption methods.
Symmetric Asymmetric
[16] X
[8] X
[18] X X
[15] X
[17] X
[9] X
[14]
[12] X
[10] X
[11] X
3 GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN CURRENT
IOT AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
3.1 Poor Transport Encryption
One critical shortfall of current IoT ecosystems is the lack of re-
liable and secure communication channels. IoT devices transmit
and receive sensitive data through networks regularly. Recently
research was conducted on IoT devices to determine their eective-
ness in securing the data they transmit [16]. e majority of tested
devices failed to encrypt the network protocols to transmit data
through the Internet and local networks. e authors also claim
that the role of encryption within the system is dicult to support.
is claim have strong merits, especially since data is transmied
through several times, from the device, the gateway, to the cloud
platform and the application in use. Sensitive IoT data breaches
occur almost every day at a large scale. Organizations that fail to
encrypt their data and communication links can not escape the
cost that comes with such security breaches, e.g., nes, forensic
investigations, credit monitoring for clients, brand damage and
litigation costs. ese are expenses all IoT stakeholders want to
avoid. Similarly, the reviewed papers studies did not explore the
importance of end- to-end encryption in IoT and failed to stress its
importance.
Another shortfall noted under this category is the poor sym-
metric encryption key management. e reviewed approaches
discussed in this survey have overlooked this limitation. e chal-
lenge here is for the user to establish a method by which they
can safely distribute the key to the intended parties to provide ac-
cess authorization [17]. Due to the possibility of communications
interception, the transmission of these keys poses new security
challenges.
Another shortfall is the shared key access mechanism itself. e
diculties arising from this mechanism are magnied due to the
ease with which the key can be misused. e prime issue here
is that whoever has the key can decrypt everything within the
network. is problem can lead to a compromise of information,
as it is being shared between several parties who are able to view
each others data.
Eective and reliable authorization and encryption are yet to
be developed to protect IoT systems against cyber criminals and
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Table 3: Summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the reviewed approaches.
Author Proposed Technique Strengths Weaknesses
[8] Certicate-based DTLS handshake del-
egation method
Reduce overhead of certicate based au-
thentication
Need change to be done on DTLS Pro-
tocol
[18] A middle gateway devices pass content
from the IoT device to Internet and vice
versa
Node is isolated from security aacks New layer of hardware must be imple-
mented
[15] Gateway, controller and central data
store authentication architecture
Use IPv6 address as a node identier Single point failure in case of CDS fail-
ure
[14] ID-based multiple authentication
scheme
Strong ability to prevent dierent at-
tacks
Requires changes to current IoT archi-
tecture
[12] Session key issued aer RA and HRA
negotiation
Remove the overhead of authentication
from the node
Single point of failure
[10] Four-way handshake added to CoAP
protocol
Distributed-base solution Vulnerable to Sybil aack
[11] Nodes are grouped into layers managed
by layer manager
Provide simple ecient authentication
using DH key exchange
Not tested against known aacks
[16] One time password using IBE-ECC Smaller key size and no need for storing
passwords
Requires changes to current IoT archi-
tecture
[9] Use PUF and PKG to provide security
and authentication
Abandon factory-deployed static keys
needs
Requires hardware change
[17] PUF-based protocols over elliptic curves Low computational and storage require-
ments and low-cost tamper
Requires hardware change
messages interception. ere is a clear need for enhanced ways of
key distribution and maintenance, e.g., key encryption.
3.2 Password Limitations
e methods of authentication discussed in this survey have under-
mined the limitations of the one password scheme. ey claim that
OTP can withstand replay and modication aacks. Based on all of
the information presented, this view is considered to be awed. It
was proven experimentally in [17] that experienced aackers may
login to systems like properly authenticated users. If an aacker
were able to intercept messages transmied, at the login stage, they
could replay it and access the system. Furthermore, with this type
of authentication, once the aacker logs in to the system for the
rst time by impersonating a legitimate user, they can continue the
aack other users without necessarily intercepting the messages
again.
Unlike certicates, passwords are vulnerable to phishing aacks.
e concept of asymmetry is the cause of this dierence. In practice,
certicate users do not reveal secret data to peers. As a result,
aackers who impersonate servers do not learn anything of value
from users.
Future work to address the limitations of the password system
is that servers can be modied to protect their messages from rst
time aacks. New secure communication methods that rely on a
key that is only shared between the two communicating users is
needed. Aer users register with the system, authentication is then
linked to and characterizes the user whose identity is veriable via
a series of steps. ese steps would enable the system to determine
when they would reject a login.
3.3 Faulty or Complex IoT Systems
Another limitation in the studies reviewed, is the inability to use IoT
with a robust communication protocol stack. Various system layers
introduce signicant amount of computation and communication
overhead. Furthermore, within the layers themselves, higher layers
are unable to see what is in the lower layers. e eects of this prob-
lem becomes apparent when network connections are unreliable.
As a result, IoT devices may be unable to adapt their transmissions
and applications to the current network conditions, even if it is
benecial to do so [17]. Additionally, these layers are unable to
specify alternatives when problems arise within the system. ese
problems are compounded by the system every time they occur,
which makes the IoT system an open target for aackers.
is challenge provides exciting opportunities for IoT develop-
ment. One such opportunity is the chance to address the problems
that come with network connectivity. Resolving network problems
and connectivity issues promotes ecient and safer IoT systems.
is would be particularly helpful when robust connections are
dicult to achieve. Another improvement opportunity is to en-
courage computer professionals to reduce the number of layers
that exist within the communication protocol stack. is reduction
would reduce the data communication complexity, hence minimize
chances of interception.
Another limitation identied from the literature survey is over-
looking the use of single sign-on in the system. is authentica-
tion and access control method is fast, ecient, user friendly and
less costly. is authentication method makes it easier for cyber
criminals who pretend to have forgoen their passwords, while in
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reality, they are impersonating somebody else. Yet, this authenti-
cation scheme has very aractive features and should be further
investigated and tested in IoT ecosystems.
3.4 Financial Implications
Another challenge that appears to have been overlooked by the
reviewed studies reviewed is the limited resources, especially in the
area of certicate-based authentication. Certicate based authenti-
cation is expensive. is scenario is even worse when it requires
extensive use with millions of IoT devices. e primary reason for
the expense is that it requires a support by a reliable public key
infrastructure.
3.5 Insecure Interfaces
Another challenge hindering the implementation of reliable au-
thentication methods in IoT systems is the access platforms and
vulnerable user interfaces. According to [16], at least six out of ten
devices tested indicated concerns with their web access interfaces.
ese concerns are issues around as poorly managed sessions, weak
default credentials, and persistent cross site blocking. With features
that allow password recoveries, the majority of devices, along with
their mobile counterparts enabled aackers to identify and use
valid accounts.
3.6 Faulty Authentication and Authorization
Experiment conducted by the authors of [16] on more than ten
authentications techniques shown that at least four of techniques
were faulty. Half this number were open for impersonalized access.
e impersonation was made possible by poor passwords, risky
password recovery mechanisms, and poorly defended login creden-
tials. As discussed by the authors, the majority of devices, along
with their cloud, failed to demand passwords that were suciently
secure. Strong passwords require the incorporation of numeric
values, alphabetic and special characters. Most devices failed to
meet such requirement. erefore, there is a need to test and evalu-
ate authentication and authorization techniques by independent
security experts or organizations before companies are allowed to
sell their IoT products in the market.
3.7 Security aws in Devices Soware and
Firmware
Most of the current IoT devices do not encrypt their communication
over the local network or even the Internet. is leaves the IoT
system open to interception aacks that may have considerable
consequences on users privacy. erefore, reliable mechanisms to
ensure data integrity and secrecy are needed.
4 CONCLUSION
In summary, the time when all things will act together in synchro-
nization is here [2, 6, 7]. ere is no doubt that the IoT technological
trend, along with its inherent security changes is gaining more pop-
ularity. It is predicted that, within the next ve years more billion
of devices will be connected to the IoTs. With the adoption of IoT
in critical applications, such as healthcare, the consequences of
insecure IoT devices would be potentially catastrophic. Fortunately,
there is a solid security infrastructure provided by our knowledge
of classical networks and the skills and resources required to secure
the IoT are available. First, manufacturers need to thoroughly test
their web interfaces for possible weaknesses. Second, they should
set security standards to manufactured IoT devices to ensure that
they oer reasonable security. Lastly, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, they should ensure that IoT devices undergo continuous
tests for security
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